Proportional Representation vs First Past the Post

The debate over proportional representation vs first past the post is usually treated as a technical question about counting votes. Mian Ashiq Hussain treats it as a question about who gets to govern. Under first past the post, he argues, a party backed by a minority of voters can rule an entire country, and in deeply divided societies that can be dangerous.

In How Constitutions Flourish or Fail, he draws on elections in the United Kingdom, Weimar Germany and India to make the case that proportional representation produces broader, more consensual and, over time, more stable democracies. This essay sets out that case, the objections he takes on, and what he believes it would mean for Pakistan.

How do first past the post and proportional representation differ?

Under first past the post, the candidate with the most votes in a constituency takes the seat, so a party can win a majority of seats with a minority of votes. Under proportional representation, seats follow each party's share of the vote, so every vote counts. The author argues the first system usually produces minority rule.

He leans on British figures to show the gap. In the 2015 UK general election, as Doug Cowan pointed out, one member of parliament was elected with only 24.5 percent of the local vote, a record low, yet that share delivered the whole seat. Nationally, the Conservatives won more than half the seats with about 37 percent of the vote, while the UK Independence Party took 13 percent of the vote and a single seat. Under a proportional system, the author notes, that party would have held around 13 percent of the seats.

For him, the deeper problem is that first past the post protects the status quo. It rewards established "electables" and dynasties, and it leaves large parts of the electorate without any real voice between elections. He links it to the global collapse in trust in governments and parties reported by the World Values Survey.

Which system do the world's strongest democracies use?

Most of them use proportional representation. Citing the Democracy Index 2019, the author notes that 15 of the 20 best-ranked democracies use some form of it, including Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands, with New Zealand and Germany using mixed systems. He reads this as a clear correlation.

These countries are part of a larger group of 92 states that elect their legislatures proportionally. The same index placed Pakistan 108th of 167 countries, in the "hybrid regime" category. The author does not claim that an electoral formula alone explains the difference. He argues that consensual systems push governments towards shared prosperity and social harmony instead of the waste of permanent adversarial politics, and he cites Norway's handling of North Sea oil, compared with Britain's, as an example of what that focus can achieve.

Did proportional representation bring down Weimar Germany?

The author argues the opposite. In the July 1932 election the Nazis won just over 37 percent of the vote, more than many British governments have had, yet under proportional representation they could not form a government on their own. They seized power by arresting opposition deputies and forcing through the Enabling Act of 1933.

He cites Hermann Göring's own claim, made at the war crimes tribunal, that under the British system the Nazis would have taken every Reichstag seat with the share of the vote they had. Since they could not take full control lawfully, they changed the rules. The author's conclusion is that a fascist takeover is more likely under first past the post without British political culture, and was the exception under proportional representation. He adds that separate safeguards can be written into a constitution to stop laws like the Enabling Act from being passed.

Post-war Germany, in his telling, completes the argument. Cowan observed that Germany's proportional system has produced more than sixty years of stable coalitions, with fewer chancellors since 1945 than Britain has had prime ministers. Germany combines constituency seats with proportional lists, and the author treats it as the model of cooperative government.

What did India's 2019 election show about first past the post?

It showed, in the author's view, how a minority can rule a vast and diverse country. The BJP won 37.36 percent of the votes cast, about a quarter of all eligible voters, yet took 303 of the 545 Lok Sabha seats. A party backed by roughly a quarter of the electorate now sets policy for everyone.

Around 900 million people were eligible to vote and about 603.7 million voted. The author attributes the landslide to Hindu nationalist populism and the frenzy that followed the Pulwama and Balakot events, noting that in the calmer election of 2014 the party had won 31 percent of the vote. He estimates that under proportional representation at least 55 percent of the seats would have gone to other parties, including those speaking for Dalits, Muslims, Sikhs and other marginalised communities.

In homogeneous societies, he accepts, first past the post may have its own advantages. In societies split by caste, creed, language or region, however, the permanent rule of the largest community carries the trappings of colonial rule. He recalls B.R. Ambedkar's warning that the downtrodden classes were tired of being governed and wanted to govern themselves. Ambedkar himself, and Pakistan's great humanitarian Abdul Sattar Edhi, both lost elections to ordinary electables, which the author offers as a sign of the talent the system keeps out.

Would proportional representation work in Pakistan?

The author believes it would, as part of a holistic package of amendments. He proposes enlarging the National Assembly to at least 700 members, with half elected from constituencies and half from party lists in proportion to votes. Provincial assemblies and local bodies would follow the same mixed pattern, while senators would be directly elected.

His reasoning starts from history. The Pakistan Movement was, at heart, a demand to protect a minority from permanent majoritarian rule; under first past the post in a united India, Muslims would have remained a perpetual minority. The same logic, he suggests, applies within Pakistan today. The population has roughly quadrupled since 1973, when the National Assembly had 200 general seats, and a larger house elected partly from lists would dilute the hold of a few families.

He anticipates the obvious objection: Pakistan already uses proportional lists for reserved seats for women and minorities, and the results are poor. His answer is that the scale changes everything. Those seats are decided by a few hundred votes inside the assemblies, which party heads can easily manage; hundreds of thousands of voters cannot be controlled from above. Parties that keep nominating favourites over merit would lose ground, while smaller parties could rise by recruiting specialists, researchers and technocrats. The list system would also reward parties that reach out to every voter, including women and people in remote areas, and he argues that money finds proxies less easily in a broad-based proportional system than under first past the post.

He pairs the change with other reforms: internal elections within parties, limits on political donations, audited party accounts, nominations backed by a majority of constituency members, and giving area as well as population some weight in drawing constituencies, which would strengthen Balochistan's voice. How the reforms fit a wider redesign of government is explored in Semi-Presidential Systems: Examples and Lessons.

What are the trade-offs?

The main objection, which the author acknowledges, is that coalition governments can be divided, unstable and indecisive. He accepts the worry may be partly valid in Pakistan's present conditions. But he argues that first past the post has not delivered stability either, and that a holistic set of amendments could change the dynamics entirely.

Pakistan's own record, he points out, includes repeated bouts of instability under parliamentary governments elected by first past the post, alternating with long periods of military rule. The prevailing system has not worked, in his judgment, so its overhaul is overdue. He also concedes that party heads may at first try to steer list elections towards their favourites, but expects competition to shift the incentives over time.

What proportional representation offers in return, he argues, is breadth. Parliaments elected this way reflect more of society, polarised positions have to soften into coalition and consensus, turnout tends to rise because every party chases every vote, and regional parties gain reasons to take up national issues. The rise of extremist leaders becomes a rarer exception. A constitution, he adds, works only when its provisions move in step with social change, which is why he wants the electoral reform debated nationwide rather than imposed piecemeal.

Frequently asked questions

Which countries use proportional representation?

According to the author, 92 states use some form of it. Among the best-ranked democracies in the Democracy Index 2019, users include Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Spain, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Malta, while New Zealand and Germany use mixed systems.

Is proportional representation unstable?

Critics say coalitions are fragile. The author replies that Germany's proportional system has produced more than six decades of stable coalitions, with fewer chancellors since 1945 than Britain has had prime ministers, and that first past the post has not kept Pakistan stable either.

What are the disadvantages of proportional representation?

The author acknowledges the risk of divided, indecisive coalition governments and the possibility that party heads will try to control party lists in the early years. He argues that both problems shrink when the system operates nationwide and is paired with internal party democracy and financial reforms.

Why does the author oppose first past the post?

Because it tends to produce minority rule. He shows that it handed India's governing party a majority with about a quarter of eligible votes, and gave Britain's Conservatives over half the seats with about 37 percent of the vote, leaving most voters without a real voice.

Read the full argument

The book places the electoral question inside a wider programme for reviving representative democracy, from party finance to the Senate. Read it in How Constitutions Flourish or Fail, and find more of the author's writing on his author page.

Related reading: Caretaker Governments: A Constitutional Black Hole, Constitutional Amendments in Pakistan: Who Holds the Pen? and Semi-Presidential Systems: Examples and Lessons.