Provincial Autonomy in Pakistan: Beyond Legislative Lists

Provincial autonomy was the promise on which Pakistan was founded, and it has been the country's most contested constitutional question ever since. Mian Ashiq Hussain argues that provincial autonomy in Pakistan is still measured too narrowly, by which subjects sit on which legislative list. Real autonomy, in his view, depends on who controls money, who sits in the federal legislature, and who can change the constitution.

In How Constitutions Flourish or Fail, he traces the idea from the Lahore Resolution of 1940 through One Unit, the breakup of 1971 and the 18th Amendment. This essay follows that history and sets out what he believes is still missing.

What is provincial autonomy?

Provincial autonomy is the provinces' power to govern their own affairs within a federation, with real legislative, executive and financial authority. The author describes it as the vertical separation of powers, between the centre and the provinces, which complements the horizontal separation between legislature, executive and judiciary. A federation needs both to stay balanced.

For the founders, he notes, this was not a technical point. Provincial autonomy topped the priorities in Jinnah's Fourteen Points, and the Lahore Resolution described the future units as autonomous and sovereign. In an interview with the Associated Press in November 1945, Jinnah said the provinces of Pakistan would enjoy autonomy of the kind found in the United States, Canada and Australia, with only a few matters such as currency and defence left to the centre. The author treats these statements as the federation's founding commitments, which later constitutions were bound to honour.

How did the demand for autonomy shape Pakistan's history?

It shaped almost everything, the author argues. Successive governments chose centralisation over the promised autonomy: the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, One Unit imposed artificial parity, and the 1956 and 1962 constitutions concentrated power at the centre. The resulting sense of exclusion in East Pakistan culminated in the separation of 1971.

He sees a missed opportunity in the Bogra Formula of 1953, which proposed two equal houses and a balance between the two wings that could have produced a genuine federation. Instead the Assembly was dissolved in 1954, the elected United Front government of East Pakistan was dismissed the same year, and West Pakistan's provinces were fused into a single One Unit province, creating a contrived parity with the east. One Unit was dismantled only in 1970. The 1962 constitution then placed the purse in the President's hands, and the reaction is told in The Six Points Formula and Provincial Autonomy.

The author explains why autonomy meant so much to Bengal in particular. For Bengalis, self-rule had long been tied to prosperity: the province flourished when it gained effective autonomy in the eighteenth century, and saw the partition of 1905 as an opening that was taken away with its revocation in 1911. When Pakistan's centre denied that hope, the cost was the country itself. He notes that Bangladesh's economy has since overtaken Pakistan's, and contrasts this with Switzerland, where a federation of very different communities has made autonomy work for everyone.

What did the 18th Amendment give the provinces?

It gave them larger shares of federal revenue through the National Finance Commission and abolished the Concurrent List, which was widely celebrated as a victory for provincial autonomy. The author's verdict is more guarded. He argues that, alongside these gains, several important subjects moved to the Federal List, so the overall picture is mixed rather than transformational.

He cites the case argued by Hafeez Pirzada before the Supreme Court in the 18th Amendment challenge: that electricity, national planning and economic coordination, and the regulation of certain professions had moved to the Federal Legislative List, making the provinces' constitutional rights over electricity difficult to exercise. The amendment also made the Prime Minister the permanent chair of the Council of Common Interests. The author further points out that the 1973 constitution was already more centralised than the colonial 1935 Act: sales tax had been a provincial subject under the Act before it passed to the centre after independence, and railways went to the federation in 1973.

The process troubled him as much as the outcome. A third of the constitution was rewritten after only a brief debate, and the provincial assemblies were never asked to approve changes to the federal bargain. Article 140A, meant to devolve power from the provinces to local governments, has not worked. A fuller assessment appears in The 18th Amendment in Pakistan: Devolution Compared.

What is still missing from provincial autonomy?

Four things, in the author's analysis: a federal upper house with real power, an effective forum for disputes between the centre and the provinces, fiscal independence based on the provinces' own taxes, and a voice for the provinces in amending the constitution. Without these, legislative lists alone cannot deliver autonomy.

An equal Senate. Under the 1973 constitution the Senate is weak on money bills, and joint sittings of both houses dilute its voice. By contrast, the 1935 Act had given both houses equal powers. Because Punjab holds more than half the country's population on about a quarter of its land, it commands a majority in the National Assembly. The author quotes the commentator Kunwar Idris on how strongly people in Balochistan, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa feel about autonomy, and argues that only a directly elected Senate with powers equal to the National Assembly can balance the federation.

A working Council of Common Interests. The council was conceived as an executive safety valve, but the scholar Anwar Syed observed that it became part of the problem: it decides by majority, the federal government can usually count on enough votes, and its decisions can be overturned by a joint sitting of Parliament. It also fails to meet as regularly as the constitution requires.

Fiscal independence. The author would replace the divisible pool with a fresh allocation of tax subjects, so that provinces raise and answer for their own revenue. He proposes, for example, a value-added tax shared overwhelmingly in the provinces' favour. The comparative case is set out in Fiscal Federalism: Lessons from Five Federations and The NFC Award and How Federations Share Revenue.

A say in the constitution. The provinces have a role in amendments only where their boundaries are affected. The author argues that because they joined the federation by consent, they should share in changing its terms, as explained in Constitutional Amendments in Pakistan: Who Holds the Pen? He also notes that more than 2,500 ordinances have been issued, a sign of how often the executive has bypassed elected legislatures altogether.

Should Pakistan create new provinces?

The author believes the question deserves open debate. India has grown from a dozen states to 28 states and eight union territories, starting with Andhra on linguistic lines in 1953. Pakistan, by contrast, has resisted change, and he argues that well-designed new units could bring government closer to people.

He points to a recent example. When the tribal areas were merged into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under the 25th Amendment in 2018, they could instead have become a province of their own. He also notes the soothing effect of renaming the North-West Frontier Province as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a reminder that identity and recognition matter in a federation. He places new provinces in the second phase of his reforms, to follow nationwide debate, and links them to stronger local government, discussed in Local Self-Government: Nordic, Indian and Pakistani Lessons.

Frequently asked questions

What does provincial autonomy mean in Pakistan?

It means the provinces' authority to legislate, govern and raise money for their own affairs within the federation. The author describes it as the vertical separation of powers and traces it to Jinnah's Fourteen Points and the 1940 Lahore Resolution.

Did the 18th Amendment give the provinces full autonomy?

Not in the author's view. It abolished the Concurrent List and raised the provinces' share of revenue, but it moved some subjects to the Federal List, made the Prime Minister the permanent head of the Council of Common Interests, and gave the provinces no role in approving it.

What is the Council of Common Interests?

It is the constitutional forum where the federal and provincial governments settle shared matters. The author, drawing on Anwar Syed, argues it decides by majority, can be overruled by a joint sitting of Parliament, and does not meet as regularly as the constitution requires.

What did Jinnah promise the provinces?

According to the author, Jinnah said in 1945 that Pakistan's provinces would have autonomy like that of the American states, Canadian provinces and Australian states, with the centre keeping only a few subjects such as currency and defence.

Read the full argument

The book follows the federal question from 1940 to the present and sets out the author's complete proposals for the Senate, fiscal federalism and new provinces. Read it in How Constitutions Flourish or Fail, and find more of the author's writing on his author page.

Related reading: The Six Points Formula and Provincial Autonomy, The 18th Amendment in Pakistan: Devolution Compared and Fiscal Federalism: Lessons from Five Federations.