The 18th Amendment in Pakistan: Devolution Compared

The 18th Amendment in the constitution of Pakistan is often described as the moment the provinces finally won their autonomy. Mian Ashiq Hussain, in How Constitutions Flourish or Fail, takes a harder look. He accepts that the 2010 amendment was a sweeping revision of the 1973 constitution, but he argues that it moved words between legislative lists far more than it moved money, administrative power or authority to the people.

His verdict is that devolution in Pakistan remains unfinished. Provinces gained a larger share of federal revenue, yet the federation kept the main taxes and even enlarged its own legislative list. Local governments were promised a constitutional place, yet they still lack money of their own. This essay sets out his reasons and compares Pakistan's experience with other federations.

What is the 18th Amendment in Pakistan's constitution?

The 18th Amendment, passed in 2010, revised roughly a third of Pakistan's 1973 constitution. Its own statement of objects admitted that the constitution had not been implemented in letter and spirit. The author sees it as a necessary repair after years of military rule, but one carried out in haste and without public involvement.

He does not dispute the need for change. Military regimes had turned the constitution into a patchwork of parts borrowed from different political systems, and restoring parliamentary democracy was a legitimate aim. His objection lies in the process. A change of this size, touching the federal compact itself, was prepared by a parliamentary committee behind closed doors and debated only briefly. In the National Assembly, he notes, very few members took part in the debate, and the Senate gave it a few days. The people were not drawn in, and the provincial assemblies were not asked to approve it, even though under the constitution provinces have almost no formal role in amendments, save when their own boundaries are affected.

For the author, this is not a technicality. A federation is a pact between its units. When the terms of that pact are rewritten by the centre without the consent of the provinces or the people, the result may be called devolution, but it does not carry the ownership that makes devolution last. He shares the view of one commentator that the amendment was more about power than people. A related argument about who should be able to amend a constitution appears in The Basic Structure Doctrine: India, Germany and Pakistan.

What did it change for the provinces?

The most celebrated change was the deletion of the Concurrent Legislative List, which sent many shared subjects to the provinces. The provincial share of the divisible pool under the National Finance Commission also rose. But the author points out that the Federal Legislative List was enlarged at the same time, so overall provincial autonomy was curtailed rather than expanded.

He gives examples of subjects that moved upwards. By assigning electricity to the federal list in broad terms, the amendment took away legislative and executive powers that provinces need to build power stations and supply their own people, which made an existing provision on provincial power projects hard to use. One of the architects of the 1973 constitution went so far as to argue before the Supreme Court that the amendment had in fact weakened provincial autonomy. The author argues that only federal electricity projects should have gone to the centre.

Other changes, in his view, strengthened the executive rather than the provinces. The Prime Minister was made permanent chair of the Council of Common Interests, the body meant to protect provincial interests, whose decisions can in any case be overridden by Parliament in joint sitting, where the federal government usually commands a majority. He records repeated complaints that the Council does not even meet as often as the constitution requires. And the rule on defecting legislators was rewritten so that the head of a party, rather than its parliamentary leader, decides on disqualification, which he believes tightened the grip of ruling families on politics.

How does Pakistan's devolution compare with India and Canada?

The author finds that Pakistan, like India, inherited a centralised colonial design, but India at least gave its local bodies constitutional shape with state finance commissions to fund them. Canada shows the opposite path: provinces with their own growing direct taxes became more autonomous over time, without needing any grand amendment.

India's 1992 amendments created chapters on panchayats and municipalities and required each state to set up a finance commission to review their finances. Implementation lagged, but the structure exists. Pakistan's 18th Amendment added a single clause, Article 140A, that tells provinces to devolve power to local governments without granting those governments any tax base. The Supreme Court had to step in to force local elections, yet working local government still did not take root, as explained in Local Self-Government: Nordic, Indian and Pakistani Lessons.

The contrast with Canada and Germany is about money and cooperation. Canadian provinces became self-reliant because their direct taxes grew with the economy, a story told in The Historical Role of Financial Governance in Federal Evolution. Germany relies on powers shared between the federation and the Länder rather than on rigid lists. The author observes that a list of subjects, on its own, tells you little about how federal a country is. Australia has a single list yet became highly centralised. What counts is who raises the money and how the tiers work together, a theme developed in Fiscal Federalism: Lessons from Five Federations.

Why did fiscal powers not follow the legislative lists?

Because the amendment redistributed shares of federal revenue instead of redistributing taxing power. The author argues that the federation kept the major taxes, the provinces stayed dependent on their slice of the divisible pool, and local governments received nothing of their own, so the fiscal structure stayed as centralised as before.

He places this in a longer history. Since independence, he argues, revenue powers have drifted steadily towards the centre, and South Asian constitutions kept colonial financial procedures that concentrate collection and distribution at the top. In his view, the 18th Amendment did not alter that direction in any fundamental way. Without adequate taxing powers, he argues, provinces and local governments do not develop fiscal capacity; healthy competition between provinces is pre-empted, and their own collection efforts shrink inside a top-down structure. The way revenue sharing works, and why he prefers assigning taxes to sharing them, is the subject of The NFC Award and How Federations Share Revenue.

He also warns against reading early American federalism into Pakistan's situation. The United States strengthened its centre because its first national government had collapsed for lack of money. Pakistan faces the opposite problem: a centre that is already too strong. American judges once praised the federal system for letting a single state serve as a laboratory for new social and economic experiments. That freedom to experiment is exactly what fiscal dependence denies Pakistan's provinces.

What still needs to change?

The author's outline of reform is to finish the job the amendment began: give provinces and local governments real taxing powers, restore a sensible field of shared responsibility, keep only genuinely national subjects at the centre, make the Council of Common Interests work, and involve the people and provinces in future constitutional change.

On the deleted Concurrent List, he argues that its hasty removal compounded the problems. Some old concurrent subjects had lain dormant or been abused, and could have been repealed. But matters such as environmental pollution and population planning have national implications and should not be left to provinces alone. Other constitutions, he notes, build shared responsibility into the wording of individual subjects, such as national highways or federal railways, rather than relying on a separate list. A more careful design would have kept cooperation where it is needed and devolved the rest. These ideas are pursued further in Provincial Autonomy in Pakistan: Beyond Legislative Lists.

Above all, he wants devolution to reach the citizen. He quotes the question of why provinces fight so hard for authority and resources from the centre while refusing to share them with the local tier that is best placed to serve people. Until that question is answered, he concludes, the 18th Amendment remains a promise rather than a reality. The demand for provincial autonomy has a long history in Pakistan, traced in The Six Points Formula and Provincial Autonomy.

Frequently asked questions

When was the 18th Amendment passed?

The 18th Amendment to Pakistan's constitution was passed in 2010. The author describes it as revising roughly one third of the 1973 constitution, with the stated aim of restoring a constitution that had not been implemented in letter and spirit.

Did the 18th Amendment abolish the Concurrent List?

Yes. It deleted the Concurrent Legislative List, sending many shared subjects to the provinces. The author points out, however, that the Federal Legislative List was expanded at the same time, and that some subjects with national implications should not have been left to provinces alone.

How is the 18th Amendment linked to the NFC Award?

The amendment increased the provinces' share of the divisible pool distributed under the National Finance Commission. The author argues that this deepened dependence on federal transfers, because the federation kept control of the main taxes instead of assigning taxing powers to the provinces.

Did the 18th Amendment create local government in Pakistan?

It added Article 140A, which requires provinces to devolve authority to elected local governments. The author considers it largely ineffective, because it gives local bodies no taxing powers or protection from dissolution, and working local government has still not taken root.

Read the full argument

The book examines the 18th Amendment alongside the full history of Pakistan's federal design and sets out a broader agenda for reform. Read it in How Constitutions Flourish or Fail, and find more of Mian Ashiq Hussain's essays.